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Abstract: The Chinese province of Shanghai has gained international recognition as a high 
performing education system with strong teaching and learning outcomes. One accountability 
mechanism in Shanghai’s education reform strategy is statewide performance-based compensation 
(PBC), also known as performance- or merit pay. Providing a first time account of PBC in the 
Shanghai context, this study investigated variance in stated and perceived aims of this policy 
instrument. To explore this variance, the study drew on data from national, state, and school level 
policy documents, and data from interviews with 20 teachers and the principal in a high performing 
elementary school. The analysis revealed that PBC was intended to improve teaching quality. 
However, the teachers’ perceived merit pay was meant to increase teacher enthusiasm, job 
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satisfaction, and participation in teacher and student development activities. Importantly, the 
teachers perceived these aims as tangential from instructional improvement goals. Based on these 
findings, I argue that this particular PBC policy, as a manifestation of the marriage of standardization 
and incentivism, is unable to fulfill the promises of this marriage – to link incentives with 
homogenous, uniform metrics associated with a generic and shared notion of teaching quality. 
Keywords: Performance-based compensation; merit pay; Shanghai, teacher accountability 
 
Una unión fracasada entre estandarización e incentivismo: Perspectivas 
divergentes sobre los objetivos de la compensación basada en el desempeño en 
Shanghai, China 
Resumen: La provincia china de Shangai ha ganado reconocimiento internacional como 
un sistema educativo de alto rendimiento con fuertes resultados de enseñanza y 
aprendizaje. Un mecanismo de responsabilización en la estrategia de reforma de la 
educación en todo el estado de Shangai es la compensación basada en el desempeño 
(PBC), también conocido como rendimiento o pago por mérito. Proporcionar una primera 
cuenta de época del PBC Shanghai en el contexto, este estudio investigó Dicho y varianza 
en AIMS percibidos de este instrumento de política. Para explorar esta variación, el estudio 
se basó en datos de documentos de política nacional, estatal y escolar, y datos de 
entrevistas con 20 profesores y el director en una escuela primaria realizando alta. El 
análisis reveló que la PBC pretendía mejorar la calidad de la enseñanza. Sin embargo, 
percibido pago por mérito de los profesores fue significada de aumentar el entusiasmo de 
profesores, satisfacción en el trabajo y alumno y profesor participación en actividades de 
desarrollo. Importante, los profesores percibieron esos objetivos como tangentes a los 
objetivos de mejora instruccional. En base a estos resultados, y argumenta que esta política 
PBC particular, como una manifestación del matrimonio de estandarización e 
incentivismo, es incapaz de cumplir las promesas de este matrimonio - para vincular 
incentivos con métricas homogéneas y uniformes asociadas a una noción genérica y 
compartida de la calidad docente. 
Palabras clave: compensación basada en el rendimiento; pago de mérito; Shangai, 
rendición de cuentas de los profesores 
 
Uma união fracassada entre padronização e incentivismo: Perspectivas divergentes 
sobre os objetivos da compensação baseada em desempenho em Xangai, China 
Resumo: A província chinesa de Xangai ganhou reconhecimento internacional como um 
sistema educacional de alto desempenho com fortes resultados de ensino e aprendizagem. 
Um mecanismo de responsabilização na estratégia de reforma da educação em todo o 
estado de Xangai é a compensação baseada no desempenho (PBC), também conhecido 
como desempenho- ou pagamento por mérito. Proporcionar um primeiro conta época do 
PBC Shanghai no contexto, este estudo investigou Dito e variância em AIMS percebidos 
de este instrumento de política. Para explorar esta variação, o estudo baseou-se em dados 
de documentos de política nível nacional, estadual e escolares, e dados de entrevistas com 
20 professores e o diretor em uma escola primária realizando alta. A análise revelou que a 
PBC pretendia melhorar a qualidade do ensino. No entanto, percebida pagamento por 
mérito dos professores foi significada de aumentar o entusiasmo de professores, satisfação 
no trabalho e aluno e professor participação em atividades de desenvolvimento. 
Importante, os professores perceberam esses objetivos como tangentes aos objetivos de 
melhoria instrucional. Com base nestes resultados, e argumenta que esta política PBC 
particular, como uma manifestação do casamento de padronização e incentivism, é incapaz 
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de cumprir as promessas de este casamento - para vincular incentivos com métricas 
homogêneos e uniformes associadas a uma noção genérica e compartilhada dos qualidade 
docente. 
Palavras-chave: compensação baseada em desempenho; pagamento de mérito; Xangai, 
prestação de contas dos professores 
A Failed Marriage between Standardization and Incentivism: Divergent 
Perspectives on Performance-Based Compensation in Shanghai 
The Chinese province of Shanghai has gained international recognition as a high performing 
education system with strong teaching and learning outcomes (Burningham, 2014; Morrison, 2014; 
OECD, 2010; Schleicher, 2016). In Surpassing Shanghai (Tucker, 2011), a book based on a study 
commissioned by the U.S. Department of Education, Shanghai is portrayed as a system that 
successfully uses accountability mechanisms to create a “professional, creative, mass education 
system” in service of a “high-skill high-wage knowledge based economy” (Sellar & Lingard, 2013a, 
2013b, p. 717). One accountability mechanism in Shanghai’s education reform strategy is state-wide 
performance-based compensation (PBC), also known as performance- or merit pay. PBC refers to 
temporary or permanent financial awards or compensation granted to individuals or groups of 
teachers based upon the attainment of predetermined performance criteria. Performance criteria 
often used to estimate teaching effectiveness determine rewards tend to include student 
performance on standardized assessments, teacher participation in professional development 
activities, teacher attendance, and student grade point average (Springer, 2009). 
PBC has scaled globally in accountability policies, particularly in leading world economies 
such as the U.S., England, and Wales (United States Department of Education, 2015). This form of 
enticements is persisting under the economic premise that rewards lead to optimal individual 
performance (Weiner, 1980). More specifically, advocates claim that financial bonuses motivate 
educators to improve instruction and teachers’ cooperation, reduce levels of attrition, thereby giving 
strong teachers incentives to stay in the workforce and encourage weak teachers to exit (Clees & 
Nabors, 1992; Hanushek & Lindseth, 2009; Lavy, 2007; OECD, 2009; The New Teacher Project, 
2014). However, experimental research shows performance-pay has done little to improve teaching 
outcomes and instruction (Balch & Springer, 2015). Also, recent qualitative research suggests 
financial incentives incite job stress, stifle collegiality, and is difficult to implement because of 
resource limitations, capacity weaknesses, and educators’ perceptions of a lack of fairness (Rice, 
Malen, Jackson, & Hoyer, 2015). Despite this, merit pay is gaining traction globally and is 
sedimented into the accountability landscape in Shanghai, a region gaining status on the global 
education policy stage. 
Providing a first time account of PBC in the Shanghai context, this study investigated 
variance in stated and perceived aims of this policy instrument. To explore this variance, this study 
drew on data from national, state, and school level policy documents, and data from interviews with 
20 teachers and the principal in a high performing elementary school. The analysis revealed that 
PBC was intended to improve teaching quality. However, the teachers’ perceived merit pay was 
meant to increase teacher enthusiasm, job satisfaction, and participation in teacher and student 
development activities. Importantly, the teachers perceived these aims as tangential from 
instructional improvement goals. Based on these findings, I argue that PBC, as a manifestation of 
the marriage of standardization and incentivism, is unable to fulfill the promises of this marriage – to 
link incentives with homogenous, uniform metrics that are linked to a generic and shared notion of 
teaching quality.  
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Design of Performance Pay Policies  
 A central feature of PBC, incentives are inherent to all forms of compensation reform (e.g., 
market-based pay, knowledge and skills-based pay, career ladders, recruitment and retention awards, 
and performance-pay (Springer, 2009). Scholars suggest that the design of PBC policies are centered 
on distinctive program goals, eligibility criteria, and award determinants (Odden & Kelley, 1997; 
Podgursky & Springer, 2007a, 2007b; Rice, Matlach, Bowsher, Hoyer, & Hyde, 2015).  
Program structures. PBC is typically structured as either absolute performance in fixed 
contracts or relative performance in tournaments. A performance-pay tournament awards a 
predetermined bonus to the top performing individuals. In contrast, a fixed contract awards bonuses 
to all individuals who meet a performance threshold. For example, in a tournament the top ten 
scoring eligible teachers receive 500 USD, while in a fixed contract all teachers who meet the 
performance threshold receive 500 USD.  
Early experiments with tournaments were shown to create competition and disrupt 
collaborative ethos among teachers (OECD, 2009). Fixed contracts also come with advantages and 
disadvantages. Collective bargaining negotiators often advocate for the lowest thresholds as possible 
in order to maximize the possibility for high threshold pass rates (Milanowski & Kimball, 2007). For 
example, in England’s first year of fixed bonuses, 97% of teachers met the performance threshold 
(Haynes, Wragg, Wragg, & Chamberlin, 2003a, 2003b). High success rates and cost uncertainty can 
cause taxpayers and the government significant and unforeseen financial burdens. Nevertheless, 
fixed contract bonuses tend to be perceived as more pragmatic and aligned with the collaborative 
ethos and norms of teachers. 
Incentive Units. Incentives are typically organized around individual, group, or hybrid 
units. The “free-rider” problem (i.e., subpar performers benefitting equally from high performers’ 
success) is the foremost challenge associated with group bonuses. Economists suggest individual 
incentives are the most likely to lead to improved labor market selection and composition of human 
capital (Lazear, 2003; Podgursky & Springer, 2007). Yet, individual teacher bonuses remain 
controversial because i) student performance is not easily attributable to an individual teacher; ii) 
individual rewards are antithetical to teamwork goals; and iii) the effects of learning are cumulative 
and build from year to year, and non-school factors greatly affect student learning. Hybrid models 
(i.e., combination of individual and group bonuses) are common in the US. For example, in the U.S. 
Teacher Advancement Program (TAP), student performance on annual state standardized tests 
determines bonuses for individual teachers and entire schools. A significant challenge of hybrid 
models is that data systems must aggregate and disaggregate data in order to link student 
performance to both individual and groups of teachers (OECD, 2009).   
Pay allocation. Globally, bonus size and distribution of PBC vary greatly (OECD, 2009). 
Springer (2009) identified the remarkable trend that bonus sizes have tended to increase due to an 
interest among policy-makers in testing whether larger incentives lead to improved teacher 
performance. Overall, bonus sizes largely depend on the number of individuals expected to receive 
bonuses and whether policymakers strive to give smaller rewards to more teachers or give larger 
rewards to fewer teachers. Bonuses are typically distributed at the end of the school year, in between 
school years, or at the start of a new school year because student tests are usually administered late 
in the school year. Research suggests that with regular and timely bonus allocations, system gaming 
behaviors decrease and perceptions of bonuses improve (OECD, 2009; Vroom, 1964). 
Performance measures. Performance measures are a contested aspect of PBC. Advocates 
for knowledge- and skill-based pay suggest bonuses for professional development, peer mentorship, 
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teacher leadership, and educational advancement motivate teachers to focus on self-improvement. 
Yet scholars also warn that measures associated with observable teacher characteristics (e.g., 
educational attainment, certification) explain little of the difference in student achievement (Berliner 
& Glass, 2014; Goldhaber, 2002). 
On the other hand, student-based performance measures include student retention, 
attendance, and grade point average (OECD, 2009; Springer, 2009; Teacher Incentive Fund, 2015); 
but test-based accountability is the most widely used - and hotly debated - measure to rank and 
reward teachers for their effectiveness. Value-added models (VAMs), Student Growth Percentiles 
(SGPs), and student learning objectives (SLOs) are three popular forms of test-based accountability. 
VAMs and SGPs determine the portion of student performance on standardized assessments that is 
attributable to a teacher. VAMs often control for student history and student- and school-level 
variables in more complex ways than SGPs. To evaluate the performance of teachers of non-tested 
subjects and grades and to create opportunities for objective conversations between all teachers and 
evaluators, some states in the U.S. are using teacher-developed SLOs to measure student growth and 
determine the teacher value-added score. Still, SLOs and benchmark assessments are not widely 
recognized as “objective” determinants of teacher performance (for further discussion see Amrein-
Beardsley, Polasky, & Holloway-Libell, 2016; Guarino, Reckase, & Wooldridge, 2015; Hallinger, 
Heck, & Murphy, 2014).  
Scholars point out that test-based accountability is an inappropriate method to evaluate and 
award merit pay to teachers for several reasons (American Educational Research Association, 2015). 
In addition to the statistical modeling challenges associated with extracting growth and value-added 
scores for individual teachers, VAMs and SGPs only apply to teachers of tested grades and subjects 
(i.e., reading and math), while teachers of non-tested students often have a school-level VAM score 
attributed to them, which can partially inform personnel decisions, including merit pay. 
Longstanding research suggests student race, class, and parents’ educational attainment more closely 
determine student achievement than teaching (Rothstein, 2005). Moreover, recent research found in-
school factors, including teaching, only explain 14% of student performance (Berliner & Glass, 
2014). Other teachers, school leaders, itinerant staff, and coaches contribute to student overall 
school performance. Additionally, standardized and interim benchmark tests items are often biased 
against students of color, from low income-families, and with low English proficiency. Scholars 
further warn that proficiency models may provoke teachers to aim to move as many students as 
possible across proficiency thresholds (Berliner & Glass, 2014; Jennings, 2012; Orland, 2015). 
Despite these critiques, student performance remains a central measure of PBC.  
The Impact and Results of PBC  
To date, there are no English language, peer reviewed studies of PBC in Shanghai or 
neighboring regions. Studies of merit pay in other contexts have illuminated insights that offer 
important understandings on teacher perspectives of merit pay and challenges with implementation. 
In rare instances, incentives have yielded slight, positive student and teacher outcomes (Balch & 
Springer, 2015; Leigh, 2012; See Table 4 in Appendix for a review of experimental research). In their 
study of the New York City, group-based PBC, Goodman and Turner (2013) found small but 
significant increases in student achievement in schools, and concluded that barriers to policy 
effectiveness included linking merit pay with school-wide performance goals, the presence of a 
punitive accountability system, and teachers’ lack of understanding about the program. The 
Mathematica Policy Institute reported that poor organization likely led to the fact that only half of 
the U.S. federal 2010 Teacher Incentive Fund districts implemented all four required program 
components, and sustainability was a challenge in 65% of districts (Chiang et al., 2015).  
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Survey data repeatedly show that teachers have substantive concerns about test-based PBC 
policies, and teachers often report merit pay has negative impact on teacher ethos (Leigh, 2012). 
Teachers seem to favor group-based incentive plans, but we know little about what aspects of 
incentives are attractive and under what conditions incentives are well received. Overall, survey data 
suggest teachers respond unfavorably to PBC and suggest that programs that base bonuses 
exclusively, or mostly, upon student performance measures negatively affect collaboration, trust, 
respect, and capacity to learn (Goldhaber, 2002; Goldhaber, Dearmond, & Deburgomaster, 2011). 
Case studies have shed light on teacher perceptions of PBC and culture and organizational 
variables relevant to PBC. Kelley and colleagues’ (2009) comparative case studies of Maryland and 
Kentucky’s state PBC mandates showed that Maryland schools were required to spend group 
bonuses entirely on school improvement; whereas Kentucky teachers had discretion over how to 
spend their money. Maryland PBC policy did not generate strong teacher or school improvement 
despite that principals reported a greater amount of flexibility and comparatively less stress and 
pressure; whereas Kentucky’s program yielded teaching improvements, despite negative reactions 
from principals and teachers.  
Studies of Prince George’s County Public Schools (PGCPS) in Maryland, a district with 
130,000 students and the 18th largest district in the US, have shed further light into how PBC 
unfolds in schools. PGCPS determined merit pay through three metrics – student growth 
models (50% of total score for teachers and 60% for principals), teacher skills/knowledge 
growth, and hard-to-staff/teach areas (Malen et al., 2015). Rice and colleagues (2012, 2015) 
found that as PGCPS leaders and teachers became increasingly overwhelmed with program 
demands, their support for merit pay waned, stress increased, and they gained concern with the 
legitimacy and fairness of teacher evaluation. Teachers expected maximum award amounts to be 
attainable, performance measures to be accurate and reliable, and eligibility restrictions justified, 
and merit pay allocation rules clear from the outset. The 2006-2010 Austin, Texas PBC program 
in was different from those of PGCPS in Maryland and Kentucky, in that teachers, and 
particularly those with National Board for Professional Teaching Standards certification, were 
instrumental in the policy design. 67% of teachers reported the program to be fair and 
supported student growth measures, and 89% of teachers deemed student growth on state 
standardized tests moderately or highly important (Lussier & Forgione, 2010).  
England and Wales offer another important lens on implementation and perceptions of 
merit pay. Starting in 2002, England and Wales were the first two countries to tie the salaries of 
full-time teachers in state-run schools entirely to performance metrics, standardized 
performance appraisals, and growth comparisons, which are assessed by head teachers (Evans, 
2011; Marsden, 2014; Radcliffe, 2013; Walker, 2013). Educational attainment and years of 
service are not factored into salary progression, and salary progression is not bound to fixed 
increases. Since 2002, the number of teachers with graduate degrees and with Qualified Teacher 
Status has increased, but higher proportions of teachers have exited the public school systems 
(Coughlan, 2014).  
Research has found teachers saw the policy as an effort to link employment to 
performance (Mahony, Hextall, & Menter, 2002); they felt like “victims of bias and management 
bullying” (Haynes et al., 2003a, p. 43) and were concerned about fairness, power, and 
inconsistency with evaluations and communication. Also, both teachers and head teachers were 
concerned about capacity for strong implementation and sustainability given a lack of funding, 
training, and agreed upon criteria (Haynes et al., 2003b; Mahony et al., 2002). Community 
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stakeholders perceived the program as nearly impossible to fund and distrusted the policy 
formulation and implementation processes (Mahoney et al., 2002; Storey, 2000).  
In this literature on PBC implementation and impact in the US, England, and Wales, 
themes of organization and capacity development are two pronounced issues (Kelley, Conley, & 
Kimball, 2000; Raham, 2000). Malen and colleagues (2015) discussed how organization and 
capacity development largely shape “partial and symbolic” implementation of merit pay 
programs. Also, self-interest and conceptions of fairness, legitimacy, and capacity for financial 
sustainability are key concerns for both evaluators and teachers. In particular, case studies’ 
accounts of how performance incentives work in complex school settings shed light on the 
strength of the bedrock assumption of performance incentives: bonuses lead to improved 
motivation, teacher performance, student performance, and school markets.  The case study of 
Shanghai builds on these case studies, further enriching our understanding of how policy actors 
and teachers perceive PBC.   
Theoretical Framework 
PBC is situated at the crossroads of standardization and incentivism, two primary strategies 
featured in global education reform and in New Public Management (Sahlberg, 2011; Trujillo, 2014). 
Accordingly, I have adopted these two concepts for analyzing the variance between stated and 
perceived aims of PBC in the case of Shanghai. 
Incentivism 
The labor economics principle of agency suggests that monetary and explicit incentives, 
rather than “fuzzy”, social, extrinsic motivators (e.g., fear of termination, popularity, respect), 
motivate individuals to perform optimally (Kreps, 1997; Weiner, 1980). Also, some economists 
argue that rather than focusing on the “irrelevant and uneconomic” (Weiner, 1980) relationship 
between incentives and motivation, PBC policies should consider the level (i.e., the total cost of a 
package for an employer or the total value of a package to an employee), functional form (i.e., the 
performance incentives), and composition (i.e., the relative amounts of the discrete components of 
the package such as cash, retirement benefits, travel reimbursement) of PBC design (Baker et al., 
1988; Earn, 1982). This view asserts that functional form is particularly important because it bears 
directly upon the level at which employees value packages (Baker et al., 1998). Moreover, some 
economists suggest that through a combination of decentralized managerial wage discretion and a 
competitive production environment (Xu, 2000), incentives should be used to promote innovation 
(Xiu & Gunderson, 2013).  
In the private sector, incentives are leveraged through profit sharing, efficiency wages, and 
firm size-based pay to employees who demonstrate strong sales and leadership (Baker, Jenson, & 
Murphy, 1988; Luthans & Stajkovic, 1999). In the context of teaching, policy actors have introduced 
incentivist policies under the premise that teachers as ‘front-line workers’ (OECD, 2014) are the 
primary means through which to improve student learning outcomes. Vagi (2014, p. 99) explained, 
“by rewarding effective teachers and providing them with opportunities to earn salaries comparable 
to those in other fields, advocates argue that more highly qualified candidates will be drawn to the 
profession as less effective teachers are forced to leave”. When teachers exert their maximum 
efforts, school districts needs are fulfilled and “moral hazards” are reduced (Goldhaber, DeArmond, 
Player, & Choi, 2008). Because districts can differentiate effectiveness and offer attractive 
compensation, they can both retain effective teachers, and increase the average level of teacher 
effectiveness (Leigh, 2012). 
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Initially, pay equalizing strategies, such as the single salary schedule, were initiated to reduce 
inequities in pay between men and women and between elementary and secondary level teachers 
(see Protsik, 1995). Yet PBC advocates maintain that this practice reduces the overall performance, 
attractiveness, and effectiveness of the education labor force and creates high opportunity costs for 
uniquely skilled people to enter the teaching labor market (Goldhaber, DeArmond, & 
Deburgomaster, 2011; Podgursky & Springer, 2007b). Lazear (2003) further suggests that even if the 
effects of incentives are not strong (i.e., merit pay fails to improve teacher and/or student 
outcomes), the very selection of human capital – embodied in high-performing teachers - are likely 
to lead to improved schools.  
Standardization 
In the area of PBC, standardization tends to hold teachers accountable for teaching a 
common curriculum and for students achieving at uniformly high quantitative levels of 
proficiency. Proficiency benchmarks are often established for the purpose of aligning learning 
objectives, curriculum, and assessment under a common framework. The U.S. 2001 Common 
Core State Standards (CCSS) and Great Britain’s 1988 Education Reform Act are primary 
examples of first-time statutory policies that created national frameworks for curriculum, and 
consequently, for standardized assessments (Meyer et al., 2014; Yarovaya, 2015). On a global 
scale, high profile international large-scale assessments, such as PISA, are used to standardize 
measures of progress across the world (Berliner, 2015; Meyer & Benavot, 2013). Standardization 
is attractive to policymakers because the combination of core curricula, lofty performance 
targets, frequent and onerous testing of students and teachers, and test-based accountability 
create the homogenous conditions deemed necessary to improve educational markets in efficient 
time frames and at low costs (Sahlberg, 2015). Such measures of standardization tend to 
privilege core academic subjects such as literacy/language arts, mathematics, and science, and 
favoring common and measurable pedagogical strategies that seek to ensure that teachers will 
“deliver” the standardized curriculum.  
PBC as the Nexus of Standardization and Incentivism 
Standardized teacher evaluation is directly related to this movement, with teachers being 
rewarded, and sometimes punished, on the basis of standardized metrics for preparation, 
development, and performance. Incentivist policies like PBC are thus viewed as efficient strategies 
to improve the teacher labor force, and consequently, create more competitive educational markets 
(Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005). By standardizing, estimating, and rewarding teaching 
effectiveness, PBC is purported to alter the labor force, maximize the labor force’s 
effort/performance, and thereby bolster educator quality, school quality, and education markets 
(Chubb & Moe, 1990; Lubienski, Scott, & DeBray, 2011; Walberg & Bast, 2003). To understand the 
potency of this idea in Shanghai, I viewed PBC as a policy situated at the junction of incentivism and 
standardization. In turn, I was able to explore in depth the source and consequences of the variance 
between stated and perceived aims of PBC in Shanghai.  
Research Design 
As noted above, the literature on PBC is limited in terms of context and scope. Scholarship 
has mostly focused on Western and developing nations that implemented short-term merit pay 
policies in school districts with poor educational outcomes. Methodologically speaking, econometric 
studies has largely focused on impact over implementation and generally ignore the contextual policy, 
sociocultural, and behavioral variables that shape the implementation and impact of PBC policies in 
Divergent Perspectives on Performance-Based Compensation in Shanghai 
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practice. Such ‘thin’ analyses do little to interrogate the fact that teacher accountability policies are 
expected to perform well regardless of place, context, or interpretation (Sahlberg, 2011).  
In contrast, case studies are a useful way to expand our understanding of complex, 
interrelated phenomena such as incentivism and teaching quality (Yin, 2003). Case studies that look 
inside of schools and communities of teachers could help us understand whether and why a given PBC 
policy work as its advocates expect, how the policy operates, and the process through which the 
consequences of financial incentives unfold in school settings. As PBC gains traction, these foci will 
illuminate the efficacy of merit pay as a teacher accountability mechanism. Scholars who have 
documented the need for context-sensitivity note that the efficacy of accountability policies can only 
be understood through investigations of impact and implementation that attend to various policy 
actors’ perceptions of policies (Glewwe, 2014; Verger, 2014). Also, contexts in which high stakes 
accountability policies such as merit pay are enacted on a state or national level, for a significant 
period of time, offer a more comprehensive landscape to study policy performance. 
Studying Incentives in Shanghai 
In 1984, China designated Shanghai as one of several Special Economic Zones (SEZ) a site 
for economic and educational innovation. Thereafter, Shanghai went through additional economic 
changes, including becoming a free trade zone, a site for foreign investment, and an incubator for 
new technologies. With these economic changes came educational reforms, namely the 2001 policy, 
First Class City, First Class Education (hereafter, First Class). First Class was intended to support 
technological advancements, elevate the quality of teaching and learning, and support the country’s 
aims of world economic leadership (Henig, 2013, Tucker, 2011). First Class aligned broader goals of 
leading in the global knowledge economy through teaching reform initiatives (Lai & Lo, 2007; 
OECD, 2011; Tucker, 2011). The policy involved that new teachers are to be mentored by veteran 
teachers and participate in team-based professional development for at least 50 hours per year. 
Moreover, school leaders should have an average of 15 years of teaching experience (OECD, 2011, 
2012b).  
Taking direction from the national Chinese Central Ministry of Education, in 2009, Shanghai 
implemented a statewide performance pay program. The Central Ministry guided districts and 
schools to set individual policies which ensured teacher compensation be comprised of 70% base 
salary and 30% performance-based compensation. The new performance appraisal system applied to 
all school employees who began work by January 1, 2009. The Central Ministry further suggested 
PBC include three parts: school-based individual performance bonuses (20%), school-based team 
performance bonuses (5%), and a district bonus for individual teachers (5%).    
The analysis presented in this paper was part of a larger study of how PBC was perceived 
and enacted in four high performing elementary schools in Shanghai. In this paper, I investigate how 
the stated and perceived aims of merit pay vary in Shanghai, and how these divergent views shaped 
the potency of the main assumption that undergirds merit pay – that financial incentives will 
increase a teacher’s motivation to improve her or his teaching (Springer, 2009; Weiner, 1980). This 
case study reports on school, city, and national documents on merit pay and data from interviews 
with 20 teachers and the principal in School M1, a high performing elementary school in Minhang 
District, a fast growing suburb of Shanghai. School M1 had 1,500 students. The school administered 
merit pay to all 80 teachers on a monthly basis and employed teachers with a range of one to 30 
years of teaching experience and tenure. My methods included semi-structured interviews and 
document analysis. The participant breakdown, interview protocol, and key terms are located in 
Appendices A and B. 
I employed a constructionist, ecological approach (Temple, 2002; Temple & Edwards, 2002; 
Temple & Young, 2004) to translate and interpret the Chinese Mandarin-based data. This involved 
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that interpreters were removed from the role of “shadowy figure” (Temple, 2002) and considered 
legitimate co-researchers in all phases of data collection and analysis. Also, the articulation of the 
background of the interpreters lends to greater credibility and trustworthiness of their “hybrid” roles 
as “analysts and cultural brokers” (Larkin, Dierckx de Casterlé, & Schotsmans, 2007; Matteson & 
Lincoln, 2009). My co-researchers were a male professor with over 20 years of experience in 
educational research and three female Master’s students at East China Normal University (ECNU).  
Data Collection  
Interviews. One co-researcher and I conducted semi-structured, one-to-one interviews 
(Bryman, 2004; Flick, 1998) with 20 teachers and the principal that lasted between 20 to 60 minutes 
each. We conducted and audio-recorded all of the interviews in Chinese Mandarin. Based on 
Patton’s (1990) framework, the interview guide included informal, open-ended, and pre-formulated 
questions. Previous studies and theory on incentivism and teacher development informed this 
protocol (See interview protocol, Table 1, Table 2 in Appendix). The sample was diverse in terms of 
grade levels and subjects taught (Chinese, English, Mathematics, Science, Art, Physical Education, 
Music), years of teaching experience, years in the school, age, and amount of merit pay received in 
the 2015-16 school year. Since approximately 90% of elementary school teachers in Shanghai are 
female, the sample included relatively few male teachers (See Table 3 in Appendix).  
Documents. In addition to interview data, the empirical material included PBC policy 
documents from the central Chinese Ministry of Education (Guidance About Implementing 
Performance Wage of Compulsory Education Schools Abstract, 2009), Shanghai Education 
Commission (Shanghai Municipal Education Commission’ opinions on completing compulsory 
education school teacher performance assessment, 2009), Minhang District (Scheme of the 
Implementation of Performance Wages in Compulsory Education Schools in Minhang District, 
2008), and School M1’s merit pay policy from 2015. Consistent with China’s education governance, 
the national and state policy documents contained general guidelines and a timetable of 
implementation. School M1’s policy, like other schools in Shanghai, spanned several pages and 
included the policy aims, rules, and tables of amounts of merit pay that corresponded with different 
performance measures.  
Data Analysis Procedures 
Translation. Departing from a positivist view that word equivalence requires forward-
backward translation, I used a social constructionist approach to translation, which included that 
throughout the translation and interpretation processes the co-researchers provided insider 
knowledge on the syntax and semantics of the language (Berman & Tyyskä, 2010; Edwards 1998; 
Temple, 2002). To ensure consistency in the interpretation of specialized terms, the translators used 
the list of key terms in Chinese Mandarin and in English (See Table 1 in Appendix). All data were 
transcribed in Chinese Mandarin, translated to English, and then analyzed to address the research 
questions. 
Coding and memoing. I coded the interview data inductively as well as deductively to fully 
capture both policy aims and participants’ interpretations of PBC. The initial list of codes derived 
from research on incentives, and the entire dataset was first coded inductively using a constant-
comparative analytic approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) to modify, delete, replace, or expand upon 
these codes based upon sentiments evoked by the participants. Subsequently, the entire dataset was 
coded a second time using codes from conceptualizations of agency, incentivism, standardization, 
teaching culture, education reform, as well as codes from case studies on merit pay. The latter codes 
included terms such as fairness, effort, instruction, improvement, and trust.  
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Check for disconfirming evidence. The coding of a random sample of one page of text in 
five of the 20 teacher interviews (Miles & Huberman, 1994) showed that there was 90% agreement 
in assigning a given code. We also performed syntax analysis on this random sample to identify the 
descriptive words that teachers most often used when they described their perspectives on how 
merit pay shapes motivation and professional identity. We used this list of high frequency words to 
further refine the memos of findings, build depth to the findings, and improve the reliability and 
validity of the data (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007). 
Strengths and Limitations of Research Design 
In generating understandings of how PBC, incentives and standardization shape teachers, 
students, and schools, this case study offers a documentation of experience in line with the strengths 
associated with case studies noted above. In particular, the study offers a much needed qualitative 
exploration of questions that are understudied in a site that is prominent in debates on education 
governance globally.  
The case study focused on a single school in Shanghai, and it should be emphasized that the 
findings from the study are neither generalizable to wider groups of teachers or schools nor do they 
capture all views within the site itself (Stake, 1998). I collected interview and document data in a 
relatively short time period due to the extensive time required for transcription and translation. 
Ethnographic methods including observations and debriefs likely would have lent to a more 
thorough representation of the context and culture of the school and participants.  
Relatedly, the participant sample included a large proportion of teachers in leadership 
positions who identified themselves as high-performing. Because of their positions, these 
participants were likely to hold extreme or radical perceptions of the aims of merit pay. These 
teachers tended to have many years of teaching experience and/or and held a great deal of 
responsibility in their teacher leadership positions. Thus, the analysis indicates that they were 
unsatisfied with the lack or robust financial incentives and with the disproportionate effort they put 
forth as compared to weak or novice teachers (see Table 3 in Appendix).  
Findings 
 Overall, city and district policymakers, as well as School M1’s principal, suggested PBC was 
squarely intended to incentivize teaching quality. On the other hand, the teachers from M1 viewed 
financial bonuses as a mechanism to incentivize teachers to improve their efforts and to differentiate 
strong from weak teachers. Moreover, teachers noted that the incentives associated with PBC did 
not necessarily lead to improved teaching quality.  
The Perspectives of Policymakers: Assessing, Rewarding and Differentiating Teacher 
Performance 
Policymakers suggested that performance assessment, and the monetary rewards linked to 
that assessment, would motivate teachers to work harder and develop their professional skills. 
Performance assessment and PBC were thus directly aimed at improving teachers and schools:  
The aim of the new performance wages allocation system is to guarantee that teachers 
get good treatment and to improve the quality of teachers. It also has significant effect 
on promoting balanced development of compulsory education in Shanghai. (Guidance 
About Implementing Performance Wage of Compulsory Education Schools Abstract, 
2009, p. 1) 
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In particular, they intended to offer performance pay to banzhuren, teacher leaders, and those 
teachers who had “great achievement.”  
City policymakers recommended performance appraisal be differentiated by teacher title; 
moral education, teaching, research, and professional development; and reflect teacher ability and 
achievements. Policymakers also encouraged principals to offer greater incentives to banzhuren. In 
addition, the city called upon school districts to: 1) learn about performance-based evaluation and 
compensation options from publications posted on the website of the national Central Government 
Education Ministry; 2) create a scientific and detailed plan on performance assessment; 3) design 
performance assessment procedures; 4) employ multiple methods of performance assessment; 5) 
undertake performance assessments in accordance with the chosen procedure; and 6) use 
performance assessment results appropriately (Shanghai Municipal Education Commission’ opinions 
on completing compulsory education school teacher performance assessment, 2009). A combination 
of qualitative and quantitative assessments, with regular input from students and parents, was meant 
to “produce more forms to record the results of performance and build [the] personal performance 
development file for teachers.” The results of these performance assessments were to be used for 
performance pay, teacher promotion, and teacher training. 
Performance assessment was intended to be guided by a self-designed teacher “work plan,” a 
peer assessment, and an evaluation from the school-based assessment group, which included the 
Principal, Chinese Communist Party Secretary, school teacher union chairperson, teachers’ congress 
representative, and a handful of teacher leaders: 
At the beginning of each school year, every teacher should make a plan of their work 
base on the demands of their position, and give it to school performance assessment 
group. At the end of school year, all teachers should write a brief summary of their 
work in this year and do a self-assessment. Also he (or she) will get a peer-
assessment and the assessment made by the school management. The school 
performance assessment group will synthesize all the assessments and make the final 
assessment of the teacher. The result of performance assessment has four levels: 
excellent, pass, barely pass and fail. Only 10-15% of teachers can reach the excellent 
level. The result of the performance assessment should be made available to 
teachers. If the teacher has questions about the result, he (or she) can appeal the 
result to school performance assessment group and education authorities. (Shanghai 
Municipal Education Commission’ opinions on completing compulsory education 
school teacher performance assessment, 2009, p. 3) 
 
Each district was to supervise performance assessment and required school teacher union 
representatives to approve the school performance assessment policy under this framework.  
As mentioned previously, the new performance appraisal applied to all school employees 
who began work by January 1, 2009. In Minhang District, the district awarded funding to schools 
for compulsory education school staff salaries in three areas: i) Job subsidies referred to the five% of 
monthly salary that teachers received according to job title and years of experience; ii) Workload 
subsidies, or base salary, comprised 70% of monthly salaries and was based upon teachers’ working 
hours, which was determined by the number of lessons a teacher taught per week; and iii) 
Performance rewards comprised 25% of monthly salaries and was intended to “reward school staff’s 
great achievement in different areas,…for overtime,…excellent (student) assessments, banzhuren (i.e., 
head teacher), and teaching and research” (Scheme of the Implementation of Performance Wages in 
Compulsory Education Schools in Minhang District, 2008).  
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School M1 policy and the Perspective of the Principal: Incentivize Participation and Sort by 
Teaching Quality 
In line with Shanghai’s practice of allowing schools to set policy at the building level, M1 had 
autonomy to create their own PBC policy. The M1 management team – which included the 
principal, vice principal, Communist Party Secretary, and Chairperson of the Labor Union – 
authored the PBC policy, which did not stray from the Central Ministry’s “70/30” guideline and 
PBC metrics guidelines. It went through several iterations, and staff were given multiple 
opportunities to offer suggestions for revisions. Like all other school policy, PBC had to earn 
approval from 70% of faculty.  
Performance-based teacher evaluation in School M1 encompassed three categories of 
assessment: i) professional and ethical conduct (e.g., attendance, dress code); ii) teaching; and iii) 
student affairs. PBC applied to the two latter categories. The M1 management team developed the 
merit pay policy in order to reward teachers for their participation in student learning and teaching 
activities. Teacher participation in student development activities was deemed particularly important 
because the focus on “rich campus life” was a new, critical aspect of the school’s mission. According 
to the M1 Executive Principal, parents in the school community were particularly concerned about 
their children’s happiness. Teacher participation in student affairs therefore underscored the 
importance of a positive school culture: 
Generally, we feel that the teachers in our school have a passionate and positive 
attitude towards work. The overall work environment is truly excellent. Many 
teachers from other schools would say, how do you manage to keep doing this, 
because we cannot go along with it. We think things should be like this. For example, 
when we organize a student activity such as “four seasons on campus”, every one of 
us will fully participate. Many teachers will provide ideas regarding the carry-out of 
the activity. This is our culture. We feel that it should be like this. (School M1 
Executive Principal, personal communication) 
  
M1 offered merit pay to individual and groups of teachers for their participation in student and 
teacher competitions (see Key Terms in Table 1 in Appendix); teacher training sessions, lectures and 
seminars; and in school-based research. A financial incentive and performance-based evaluation 
points were assigned to each activity, and in the case of competitions, to ranking levels (e.g., first 
place, second place). An incentive and points ceiling for each activity category was instituted in order 
to encourage multifaceted teacher development:  
Each category has a maximum score, and the overall maximum score is 20. You can 
do more, but it will not go over 20. It took us a long time to design this system, 
because we want the teachers to have balanced development rather than one-sided 
development, and the maximum score limit encourages them to seek development in 
multiple aspects.  (School M1 Executive Principal, personal communication) 
 
Merit pay was also offered to teachers who taught students in subjects (Chinese, English, and Math) 
in grades (3-5) that were subject to assessment. It was unclear whether teachers of non-tested 
subjects (music, art, science, physical education) and grades (first and second) received student 
performance scores.  
The Executive Principal explained that performance appraisal and pay helped sort teachers 
by performance and provoke more effort from underperforming teachers:  
Yes, it needs to be disciplined and democratic, but my review result should never be 
“everybody is equally good”. We need to provide incentives through such evaluation, 
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making teachers who performed well feel recognized, while also making the teachers 
who performed poorly realize that the school is aware of that. If they see the gap, 
they will make more efforts next semester. 
 
From her perspective, school M1’s goal was clear, focused on identifying and rewarding superior 
performance through standardized and performance-based measures:  
Our principle is those who perform better get more pay. We cannot let the teachers 
feel that the more they do, the more mistakes they will make, or that they will get the 
same amount of money whether they work extra or not. They get more when they 
perform better.  
Teacher Perspectives on the Aims of Financial Bonuses  
Most of the M1 teachers reported that they were unclear on the intended aims of 
performance pay but suspected bonuses were meant to positively shape teacher enthusiasm, 
professional satisfaction, development, and effort. A fourth-grade English teacher elaborated that 
bonuses helped instill “professional happiness” in all teachers and encouraged teachers to work 
harder. In terms of specific areas of work, she suggested merit pay was intended to encourage 
teachers to participate in research projects. A male third-grade IT teacher echoed this sentiment. He 
added that before 2009, “all teachers got the same pay no matter what they did. It was easy to 
become lazy.”  
Unclear rewards and unpersuasive metrics. Basic salary was distributed into teacher bank 
accounts on the last weekday of each month, individual and team rewards were distributed at the 
end of fall and spring semesters, and the district award was distributed once per year. Basic salary 
was based upon number of working hours, calculated on the basis of taught lessons per month. The 
participants in this study taught between 11 and 17 lessons per week, and one lesson lasted 90 
minutes. Moreover, basic salary was based upon professional title. Teachers had a coefficient of 1.0, 
teacher leaders of subjects and grade-levels had a coefficient of 1.2, and banzhuren had a coefficient 
of 1.3. The basic salary remained quite consistent, as teachers normally taught the same number of 
lessons per week.  
The criteria for the district bonus were not transparent or made available to teachers. 
Teachers reported that they did not know how districts chose teachers of excellence, or whom the 
district chose in a given year. The individual and team-based PBC allocation and structure were far 
more detailed. Individual teachers earned merit pay for three different types of activities, and each 
activity was associated with different awards. The first type of activities involved professional 
development (seminars, lesson study, peer observation, and curriculum development).  
Second, teachers also earned bonuses for participating in action research projects. In these 
projects, teams of teachers investigated pedagogical approaches through book study, engagement 
with university-based researchers, and “lesson study”. Lesson study involves that the teachers 
observe a peer teaching a lesson and provides detailed feedback.  
The third category of PBC activities involved that teachers of Chinese, English, and 
Mathematics in grades three through five might earn bonuses on the basis of student performance in 
standardized assessments. In addition, these teachers and those of non-tested subjects and non-
tested grades had opportunities to earn bonus pay for student competitions on district, province, 
and state level. Different bonus amounts were associated with first-, second-, and third-place 
rankings in these competitions. In particular, Physical Education and Art teachers in upper primary 
grades were heavily engaged in student competitions, though teachers of all subjects reported they 
participated in student competitions. Teachers also participated in their own teaching competitions. 
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In these events, teachers gave mock teaching demonstrations in order to compete against their 
district and province counterparts for demonstration of high quality instruction and student 
engagement.  
Authority on awarding PBC. When asked about who was involved in merit pay 
determinations and the processes through which merit pay decision were made, most teachers spoke 
about performance appraisal. Teacher performance-based appraisal was carried out by a team of ten 
people, which included the school management, leaders in the teaching research group, and various 
teacher leaders across campus. Each teacher’s subject- and grade-level teacher leader also weighed in 
on the evaluation. All teachers received performance-based rankings of A, B, C, or D. Typically, 
teachers who received an A grade also earned the most merit pay. The M1 Principal explained that at 
least 80% of teachers received A’s, 15% received B’s, and no more than 5% received C’s. The M1 
Principal had final say in all evaluation determinations and bonus allocations. 
Disguising salary supplements as incentives. Teachers elaborated that bonuses were 
directly tied to evidence of additional work time, yet perspectives differed on the significance of the 
bonuses. A second-grade banzhuren teacher likened merit pay to the work of a farmer: “It feels like a 
farmer’s harvest. However much you cultivate is how much you gain.” She emphasized, “merit pay 
encourages everyone to do their best to accomplish more work.” She reported her base salary as 
about $643 per month and her base annual salary as between $8,500 to $10,000. Several teachers 
added that bonuses associated with participation in activities provided marginal salary supplements. 
A first-grade Math teacher explained: 
There is no ‘high salary’ and ‘low salary.’ At most, they will give you a little extra 
money to reward you. Now, we all (highly active and less active) get more salary and 
merit pay. We get more money than before, but there is little difference among 
teachers. 
 
The Physical Education Department Head for third-grade offered a different perspective. She 
reported large gaps in performance rewards: “Some people get a lot of merit pay, but some people 
only get a little.” She explained that bonuses ensured “talented and active teachers are valued” 
because previously those who “did more things” were not compensated for their extra effort. This 
teacher reported her salary as between $18,000 to $20,000 per year. When probed for salary figures, 
every teacher said they were unsure of the amount of monthly merit pay they received because this 
figure was not designated clearly in their pay stubs.  
Whether or not bonuses were significant, the majority of participants suggested that less 
active, “lazy,” or “low performing” teachers had the most to gain from financial bonuses. A fifth-
grade Science teacher commented, “For good teachers, merit pay makes no difference. But for the 
teachers who are a little poor, there might be some impact.” A first- and second-grade Art teacher 
explained that active, “good” teachers already engaged in activities to support students and teaching, 
and merit pay was “just a token of affirmation.” Since 15 out of 20 of the teacher participants were 
teacher leaders (e.g., subject head, grade-level head, banzhuren), they represented the highest 
performing teachers in M1. All of these teacher leaders echoed the sentiment that merit pay was 
likely intended to inspire more enthusiasm and participation in activities from the lower performing 
teachers.  
Overall, teachers were ambivalent toward the idea of merit pay as an incentive. One Chinese 
teacher described merit pay as “a salary supplement,” and a Music teacher described merit pay as 
“the same as our salary before but just called something else.” A veteran teacher further suggested, 
“basically they reorganized the salary into something we can be sure about and something we cannot 
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be sure about.” Teachers suggested merit pay was not much of an incentive and not particularly 
attractive in size. 
Teachers reported their merit pay as between $285 to $1,800 per semester, and their base 
salary as between $430 to $930 dollars per month. The median merit pay reported was $430, and the 
median base salary reported was $715. Of the eight teachers who had six or less years of experience, 
six teachers reported their merit pay as approximately one-third of their total monthly salary. All 
teachers reported their salaries did not fluctuate by more than $140 per month, or about 10% of 
their total salary. All of the 12 participants who worked as teachers in Shanghai before 2009 reported 
that their salaries increased by no more than 3% since the onset of PBC. 
One Physical Education teacher reported that she received between $1,715 and $1,860 at the 
end of each semester in the school year 2015-16, which was one of the highest reported merit 
payments. She echoed other participants’ sentiments that there was little difference among teachers 
and “no such thing as high salary or low salary,” but everyone had “more money than before.” 
Several teachers noted they earned the most merit pay from leading student activities and helping 
their students win competitions. Other teachers explained that the additional salary provided by 
merit pay neither functioned as an incentive nor as an adequate reimbursement for additional effort 
and leadership. A Mathematics teacher explained: 
For me there is not much difference. You do your job and the school assesses it. The 
fundamental work is teaching classes, grading homework, and instructing the 
students. I did this before and I do this now. The other activities have limited scores. 
No matter how much you accomplish, the highest score you can get is 20. Even if 
you and me get different scores, the money we get is not that different. Just a few 
dozen or hundred yuan. Like me, I am the leader of the teaching and research group, 
I will just get a few hundred yuan more than the teachers in my group. So we don’t 
care much about it. We will still do our job that we have to do as a teacher. 
Discussion: A Failed Marriage of Standardization and Incentivism 
In the view of state, district, and school policymakers, the PBC categories of student 
activities, research, and professional development served as proxies and stimuli for teaching quality. 
In other words, the hope was that by rewarding teachers’ greater efforts, teaching quality would 
improve. The city and district required schools to develop performance pay policies that included 
teacher self-, peer-, and committee-based performance assessment of teacher performance. Merit 
pay was to be allocated selectively and awarded to the top tier of teachers and determined based 
upon teacher title; ability; achievements; and teacher progress in moral education, research, and 
professional development. School M1’s vision for merit pay and procedures were developed under 
these aspirations.  
The M1 teachers in this study, thus, did not subscribe to policymakers’ neat, clear 
connection between non-classroom activities, incentives, and teaching quality. Nearly all teacher 
participants reported that they did not see a connection between participation in student and 
teaching activities and teacher quality, and approximately half of the participants reported that there 
was no relationship between merit pay and teaching quality. Those teachers who did not see a link 
between merit pay and teaching quality perceived that merit pay did not positively affect their own 
and their colleagues’ enthusiasm and professional satisfaction, was unlikely to provoke poorly 
performing or “lazy” teachers to engage in more activities, and, at best, offered a deserved salary 
boost to “good” and highly engaged teachers. This group of teachers was quite clear that teachers’ 
increased school, or non-classroom, engagement did not necessarily lead to improved teaching 
quality. Overall, the M1 teacher participants reported they were unsure of the exact aims of merit 
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pay. They perceived bonuses were intended to strengthen teacher enthusiasm, improve job 
satisfaction, and incentivize teacher participation activities that supported teacher and student 
development. In their words, at best, bonuses incentivized increased effort and work time, and this 
increased effort differentiated high from low performing teachers. In the eyes of these teachers, 
bonuses thus functioned as salary supplements rather than incentives to (re)contour one’s quality of 
teaching.  
As discussed earlier, the cognitive frames of standardization and incentivism, which have 
propelled PBC into the global education policy sphere, presume a neat, direct link between financial 
incentives and teacher performance. The analysis shows that these cognitive frames also undergird 
Shanghai educational policymakers’ and leaders’ approach to PBC for teachers. However, as a 
distinctive marriage of incentivism and standardization, the PBC policy in Shanghai is deeply 
challenged by the fact that policymakers were not able to clearly define the aims of this marriage and 
communicate it to those meant to be incentivized, that is, the teachers. More specifically, they offer a 
vague, misguided articulation of high quality teaching. This practice is not uncommon. In education 
policy, notions of quality are generic and responsive to the needs of neoliberal globalization (Ball, 
2012). In Surpassing Shanghai, Tucker (2011) asserted high quality teachers hold “a high level of 
general intelligence, a solid mastery of the subjects to be taught, and a demonstrated aptitude for 
engaging students and helping them understand what is being taught” (p. 178). More recently, 
OECD Director Andreas Schleicher (2016) extolled both the importance of teaching quality, the 
quality of Shanghai’s teachers, and the value of teaching for innovation: 
…And nowhere does the quality of a school system exceed the quality of its 
teachers. The East Asian school systems all pay great attention to how they select 
and train their staff. And when deciding where to invest, they prioritize the quality of 
teachers over the size of classes. They provide intelligent pathways for teachers to 
grow in their careers. High-performing countries have also moved on from 
bureaucratic control and accountability to professional forms of work organization. 
They encourage their teachers to make innovations in pedagogy, to improve their 
own performance and that of their colleagues, and to pursue professional 
development that leads to stronger education practice. The goal of the past was 
standardization and compliance; but today's top-performing countries value 
inventiveness. In the past, policy focused on providing education; today's top school 
systems focus on outcomes, shifting from looking upwards in the bureaucracy to 
looking outwards to the next teacher, the next school, to create networks of 
innovation. You can see that nowhere better than in Finland or Shanghai. 
 
From a relational perspective on ideas and institutional change (Verger, 2014), the nebulous 
‘innovation and intelligence’-centered character of ‘quality’ translates well into the normative 
ideology of neoliberal globalization. This notion of quality underscores neoliberalism’s effort to 
produce “docile, productive…and enterprising teachers” and to commodify the profession of 
teaching (Ball, 2012, p. 29). In neoliberal globalization, quality needs to remain nimble to the 
unforeseen and ever-changing demands of educational markets. ‘Quality’ retains a vague yet 
convincing character in policy due to its “common-sense” appeal, as well as appeal to teachers to 
elevate themselves in the name of individualistic, economic competition (see La Londe et al.., 2015). 
Yet as we see in the implementation of PBC in School M1, many teachers remain unconvinced 
about the potential of standardization and incentivist principles to propel teaching quality forward. 
Several teachers are crystal clear that the behaviors that link rewards to teaching quality are ill 
defined. Their perspectives illuminate the fact that standardizing and commodifying teachers’ practice 
does not propel (the improvement of) teaching quality. Instead, quality is elevated by improving the 
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learning that happens inside of classrooms and strengthening the culture between and among teachers and 
students. As such, Schleicher’s (2016) juxtaposition of standardization and innovation is misleading. 
The question of ‘what is quality’ remains highly contested in education policy and in a range 
of teaching and teacher preparation literature. However, the empirical record makes clear that issues 
of power, fairness, and inconsistency are readily at play when policymakers invoke incentivism and 
standardization in teacher policy. Scholars have found that in the US and in England and Wales, 
PBC implementation has been plagued by organization and capacity development, and that teachers’ 
trust in the policy and system leaders’ fidelity to the policy wane over time. Teacher improvement 
literature consistently asserts that teacher buy-in, enthusiasm, trust, and self-efficacy are central to 
their pursuit of teaching improvement (Darling-Hammond, 2013). Without these conditions, 
manifestations of incentivism and standardization, such as the PBC policy in Shanghai, are likely to 
neither positively impact student achievement and teaching performance nor engage teachers in the 
messy, self-reflective work required in learning and teaching improvements. Without these 
conditions and without an articulate, sound vision of teaching quality endorsed and shared by those 
practicing it, the weak impact of the policy observed in School M1 is not surprising.  
Conclusion 
The claim with which standardization and incentivism have penetrated high-stakes teacher 
accountability globally is fairly straightforward and compelling.  Inherent in the theory of action 
behind PBC is the idea that bonuses motivate educators to behave in desirable ways, incentivize 
strong teachers to join and stay in the workforce, and encourage weak teachers to exit (Hanushek & 
Lindseth, 2009; Weiner, 1980). The idea that an incentive, determined by standardized and 
measurable targets and outcomes, renovates teaching, learning, schools, and markets is a policy 
proposal that is well received by policy actors, such as those in Shanghai. A high performing system 
with an increasing base of admirers, policymakers in Shanghai have found great promise in the 
power of incentives to improve teaching quality as a means to become and remain truly “first class.” 
Accordingly, policymakers have required school districts and leaders to create comprehensive 
performance appraisal and pay plans that award teachers more for their efforts - and identify those 
who do not improve and thus should be encouraged to exit the market. The perspectives of teachers 
in School M1 effectively question the PBC underpinnings of incentivism and standardization. In 
doing so, they prompt us to ask: What is the efficacy of incentivist policies, such as performance-
based compensation, when policymakers conflate effort with quality? What exact behaviors should 
policy incentivize in order to boost teaching quality? If bonuses neither dramatically elevate the 
quality of low performing teachers nor force low performing teachers to exit the workforce, what 
becomes of the incentivism-standardization marriage as a distinct policy paradigm? These questions 
highlight that research on high-stakes teacher accountability policies like PBC should critically assess 
the particular conditions under which incentive-based teacher accountability policies may positively 
shape learning and teaching.  
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Appendix 
Interview Protocol English and Chinese Mandarin 
Purposes of interview/访谈的目的 
The purpose of the interview is to better understand how teachers, principals, and other 
administrators make sense of performance incentives. Specifically: 
1. How do participants understand the aims of performance incentives? (Q1, Q2)
2. What are participants’ experiences with performance incentives? (Q2, Q3)
3. In what ways do performance incentives contribute to teaching/leadership effectiveness for
this teacher/administrator? (Q4)
4. What are the participants’ experiences with relational trust and teamwork among their
colleagues? (Q5)
5. In what ways do performance incentives shape trust and teamwork? (Q6)
访谈的目的是为了更好地了解教师、校长、和其他管理者如何理解绩效奖励（绩效工
资）。具体如下： 
1、参与者（教师、校长、其他管理者）如何理解绩效奖励的目的?(Q1、Q2) 
2、参与者（教师、校长、其他管理者）对绩效奖励有怎样的体会?(Q2、Q3) 
3、绩效奖励是通过什么样的方式使教师和其他管理者提高教学领导效能？（Q4） 
4 、关于同事之间的信任关系、团队工作，参与者有怎样的体验？（Q5） 
5、绩效奖励（绩效工资）在以怎样的方式形成同事之间的信任和团队工作？（Q6） 
Introductions, informed consent, permission to tape, Background/介绍、知情同意、录音
许可 
A. [Ice-breaker, could also use some other comfortable question to get started]. Before I started my
doctorate work, I also worked in schools. I always enjoy chatting with educators. It is my
pleasure to be here in Shanghai and learn about you. Could you share with me how you decided
to become an educator?
A.（“破冰船”，也可以使用其他一些舒适的问题开始）。在我读博士之前,我在学校工作
过，我总是喜欢和教育工作者聊天。我很高兴能够在上海认识您。您能够和我分享一下您
为何愿意成为一名教育工作者呢？
B. I would like to learn more about your experiences in education. Can you tell me more about
your experiences? How long have you taught? Which ages? Which schools? How long have you
been a school leader? Which ages? Which schools? Where did you receive your training?
B、我想了解更多关于您的教育经历。您能告诉我更多关于您的经历吗?您任教多长时间
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了？从多少岁开始？您所在的学校是？您成为这个学校的领导者有多长时间？从几岁开
始？您所在的学校是？在此之前您在哪里接受培养或培训过？ 
Aims/purposes of performance incentives 
 
Now I would like to talk about performance incentives. Performance incentives are financial 
bonuses given to teachers and school leaders whose students perform well. This could be a bonus 
for an individual teacher, a group of teachers, or all the teachers and leaders in an entire school. Said 
another way, these bonuses are incentives given to teachers for improved or superior student 
performance. I am interested in learning about your perspectives on and experiences with 
performance incentives. So let’s begin, ok? 
 
1. How would you describe the purpose of performance incentives? 
a. How did you learn about performance incentives? Did the Ministry of Education or 
your principal explain incentives to you?  
b. When did you first learn about performance incentives? 
c. Please describe the performance incentive policy in your school as you understand it. 
d. What do you understand as the process for receiving a bonus?  
e. What other policies reward teachers and leaders for good student performance? 
 
2. What is your overall view of performance incentives? 
a. What do you think are some benefits of awarding incentives to teachers and school 
leaders for student performance? 
b. How would you describe the challenges associated with awarding incentives to 
teachers and school leaders for student performance? 
 
Brief member check on questions 1 & 2 
 绩效奖励的目的  
    现在，我想谈论绩效奖励（绩效工资）。绩效奖励（绩效工资）就是给予学生表现出色
的教师和学校领导一定经济上的奖励。这种奖励可以是给予教师个体、教师群体、或者整
个学校的所有老师和领导。换句话说，这些奖金是奖励给那些学生表现突出或者学生有所
进步的教师们的。因此，我非常想了解您对于绩效奖励（绩效工资）有哪些个人的想法和
体验。我们现在开始访谈，可以吗？ 
1、您认为绩效奖励有怎样的目的？ 
    a. 您之前怎样理解绩效奖励？教育部门（教育部）或者你们的校长向你们解释过绩效奖
励（绩效工资）这一措施吗？ 
    b. 您第一次知道（或者了解）绩效奖励（绩效工资）是在什么时候？ 
c. 您是否可以描述一下就您所理解的，学校目前实施的绩效奖励（绩效工资）政策 
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d.您所理解到的获取奖金的过程是什么样的？
e.对于学生表现好的教师和领导，还有没有其他的奖励政策（或者措施）？
2、您对绩效奖励（绩效工资）的总体看法是什么？ 
a.您认为给学生表现好的教师和领导授予奖励，会带来哪些好处？
b.您认为对于学生表现好的教师和领导予以奖励的同时，会带来哪些挑战？
再快速检查一下问题 1和 2 。 
Experiences with performance incentives 
3. What are your personal experiences with performance incentives?
a. Please describe the incentives you have received.
b. How much was the bonus?
c. When did you receive the bonus?
d. How does this bonus shape your overall salary?
e. What do you understand to be the reason you received this bonus? If student
performance, what specific performance warranted this bonus?
f. Who made this bonus allocation decision?
g. In your opinion, how is your experience with bonuses similar to or different from
your colleagues’ experiences with bonuses? Please explain.
4. What are your perceptions of how incentives contribute to teaching and leadership
effectiveness?
a. How do incentives shape your teaching? Approach to teaching? Commitment to
teaching? Motivation to learn about teaching?
b. How would you evaluate the value or contribution of incentives to your overall
teaching effectiveness?
c. What else would help you be the best teacher you can be?
Brief member check on questions 3 & 4 
对绩效奖励的体验 
3、对于绩效奖励您有什么个人的体验？ 
a.请您谈谈您得到过什么样的绩效奖励。
b.奖金多少？
c.您什么时候得到这笔奖金？
d.这笔奖励如何改变您的整个工资？
e.您理解您得到这笔奖金的缘由是什么（您知道您是因为什么得到这笔奖金的吗）？如果
是因为学生，您认为学生表现如何才能让您得到奖金？ 
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f.谁来决定奖金的分配？
g.在您看来，当获得奖金时，您的体验和同事的体验有何异同？？请详细阐述下。
4、你如何理解绩效奖励有助于提高教学与领导的有效性？ 
a.绩效奖励是如何影响（或者塑造）您的教学？如教学的方式方法？对教学的认同感？学
会教学的愿望？ 
b.对于您整体的教学效能，您如何评价绩效奖励的价值与贡献？
c.还有什么能够帮助您成为一名好老师？
快速检查问题 3和 4。 
How performance incentives shape trust and teamwork 
In the last part of this interview I want to talk about how incentives shape the trust between you and 
your colleagues and how incentives shape your teamwork. A lot of research tells us about what 
incentives are and the goals of incentives. But we don’t know very much about how incentives shape 
how teachers collaborate together and approach each other? So let’s begin, ok? 
5. Relational Trust and Teamwork
a. How would you describe your relationships with your fellow teachers? Principal?
Other school leaders?
b. In what ways does trust matter for in your work?
c. Can you give an example of 1-2 colleagues whom you trust a great deal?
d. In what ways do you work with your colleagues?
e. In your view, how does this teamwork contribute to your teaching effectiveness?
6. Role of performance incentives in relational trust and teamwork
a. In your view, how do financial bonuses shape your relationships with your
colleagues? With your principal? Can you give an example of this?
b. How do bonuses for student performance shape the work you and your colleagues
do together?
c. Think about a time when you received a bonus. How did your colleagues learn about
your bonus? What made you decide to take this approach? Or if the Ministry or your
principal shared this information, in what ways did your colleagues react?
d. Think about a time when you learned one of your colleagues received a bonus. Can
you describe how you learned about this? Can you describe your reactions?
e. What other issues and concerns do you have related to performance incentives and
your work or your work with your colleagues?
Brief member check on questions 5 & 6 
绩效奖励如何塑造（或者影响）信任与团队合作？
在访谈的最后一部分，我想了解绩效奖励（绩效工资）如何影响（或者塑造）您和同事之
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间的信任关系，如何影响您的团队工作。很多研究是阐述绩效工资的内涵和绩效工资的目
标。但是，关于绩效工资如何推动教师间的合作和密切教师间的相互关系，我们知之甚
少。我们现在开始访谈，可以吗？ 
5、关系信任和团队合作 
a. 您觉得您和各位老师的关系如何?和校长的关系如何？和其他学校领导的关系如何？ 
b. 信任是以什么方式影响您的工作的？ 
c. 说说您非常信任的 1-2同事。 
d. 您以什么方式和您的同事一起工作？ 
e. 在您看来，团队合作怎样有助于您的教学效能的提高？ 
6、在关系信任和团队合作中，绩效奖励的作用 
a. 在您看来，经济上的奖励怎样影响你和同事之间的关系，和校长之间的关系？请举一例 
b. 因学生的表现而获得的奖金如何影响你和同事之间的团队合作？ 
c. 当你得到奖金时，你的同事是如何获知这一信息的？如果是您告知同事的，是什么促使
您告知同事的，是什么促使您做出这一决定的？或者如果教育部或者校长分享（或者公
布）这一信息时，你的同事反应如何？（你的同事以什么样的方式反应？） 
d. 想想当您知道您的一个同事得到奖金时，您是如何获知的？您能描述您当时的反应吗？ 
e. 关于绩效奖励以及你和同事之间的团队合作，您还有什么其他的问题吗？ 
快速检查问题 5 & 6 
 
 
 
 
  
Divergent Perspectives on Performance-Based Compensation in Shanghai 29 
Table 1 
Key Terms Translation 
English 
Term 
English Definition* Mandarin Pin 
Yin 
Mandarin 
Characters 
salary overall composite of compensation a teacher 
received in a fixed salary distribution period 
gong zi 工资 
base pay the total fixd salary that a teacher receives in a 
fixed salary distribution period 
ji chu xing gongzi 基础性工资 
merit pay the total variable salary that a teacher receives 
in a fixed salary distribution period 
ji xiao gong zi 绩效工资 
merit pay 
bonus 
the variable salary determined by the school 
administration that a teacher will receive in a 
fixed salary distribution period  
jiang li xing ji 
xiao gongzi 
奖励性绩效
工资 
district bonus the variable salary determined by the district 
leadership that a teacher is eligible to receive 
in at the end of the first and second semester 
qu jiang li 区奖励 
city bonus the variable salary determined by the city 
leadership that a teacher is eligible to receive 
one time at the end of the school year 
shi jiang li 市奖励 
motivation desire, willingness, or reasons to do 
something 
dong ji 动机 
fair what is just, appropriate, legitimate, or within 
the rules and standards 
gong ping 公平 
love deep affection, interest, or pleasure ai xin 爱心 
enthusiasm eager enjoyment or excitement re qing 热情 
passion intense desire or enthusiasm ji qing 激情 
morality principles held by a person, group or a 
society, concerning the distinction between 
right and wrong or good and bad behavior 
dao de 道德 
conscientious
ness, 
conscientious 
the act of doing what is right or to do one’s 
work well or thoroughly 
liang xin 良心 
responsibility a duty to fulfill the obligations and 
assignments prescribed to a teacher 
zeren 责任 
teaching 
quality 
a teacher’s skills and aptitude jiao xue zhi liang 教学质量 
team work two or more teachers working together tuan dui he zuo 团队合作 
relationship the interactions, relations, and 
communications between two or more people 
guan xi 关系 
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Table 1 cont’d. 
Key Terms Translation 
English 
Term 
English Definition* Mandarin Pin 
Yin 
Mandarin 
Characters 
working 
hours 
the number of class periods a teacher teaches 
in one week 
gong zuo shi 
chang 
工作时长 
number of 
classes 
the number of cohorts of students a teacher is 
responsible for teaching in one academic year 
ke shi liang 课时量 
competition events that occur throughout the school year 
wherein students and teachers from schools in 
neighboring districts or provences compete 
against one another in mathematics, science, 
Chinese, English, art, music, and physical 
education 
bi sai 
jing sai 
比赛／竞赛 
teacher 
competition 
events that occur throughout the school year 
wherein teachers from schools in neighboring 
districts or provinces compete against one 
another to showcase pedagogy and instruction 
in their subject area expertise 
jiaoxuejingsaishi 
fan ke 
gong kai ke 
教学竞赛／
示范课／公
开课  
student 
competition 
events that occur throughout the school year 
wherein students from schools in neighboring 
districts or provinces compete against one 
another in mathematics, science, Chinese, 
English, art, music, and physical education 
ti yu bi sai 
ke ji jing sai wenti 
lei bi sai 
体育比赛／
科技竞赛／
文体类比赛 
veteran 
teacher 
a teacher with five or more years of teaching 
experience 
lao jiao shi 老教师 
novice 
teacher 
a teacher with four or less years of teaching 
experience 
xin jiao shi 新教师 
purpose the aims of a particular policy, program, or act mu di 目的 
Head 
Teacher 
the teacher in charge of general matters of a 
class (section) of students, who usually also 
teaches one subject to the students of that 
class 
ban zhu ren 班主任 
Pioneer 
battalion 
counselor 
the counselor for a school’s Young Pioneers 
Organization 
da dui fu dao 
yuan  
大队辅导员 
Young 
Pioneer / 
Red Scarf 
Organization 
a mass youth organization for children aged 
six to fourteen under the Communist Party of 
China; usually every elementary student 
becomes a member sooner or later 
shao xian dui 
hong ling jin 
少先队 / 红
领巾 
Note. * These terms were adapted from their broader meanings and applied to the context of teachers and teaching. 
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Table 2. 
Recruitment Questionnaire and Information Sheet 
English Chinese Mandarin 
My name is Priya La Londe. I am a doctoral 
candidate at the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign, a large research university 
in the United States of America. I am 
conducting research on how financial bonuses 
and other incentives shape school culture in 
high performing schools in Shanghai, China. 
This study is important because education 
policy around the world is moving toward 
awarding bonuses or merit pay to teachers and 
administrators whose students perform well on 
standardized assessments. I have two goals for 
this research. First, I want to describe the 
scope and aims of bonuses/merit pay and how 
they are used in schools. Second, I want to 
analyze how how bonuses/merit pay shapes 
school culture – specifically in terms of trust 
and collaboration among teachers. I will not 
collect any identifiable data on students or 
teachers. I am not here to judge or evaluate 
your school or you work. I simply want to 
better understand your experiences with merit 
pay and your thoughts about how these 
bonuses shape your work. 
我叫 Priya La Londe，是一名来自伊利诺
伊大学厄巴纳——香槟分校的博士研究生。
伊利诺伊大学是美国一流研究型大学。目前
我正在研究财政补贴和其他激励措施如何塑
造校园文化，研究范围是中国上海的优质学
校。本研究的重要性在于，目前世界各地的
教育系统都在致力于推行以学生表现为评价
标准的奖金制度。本研究主要有以下两个目
的：首先，我希望了解贵校设立奖金的目
的，奖金的内部结构以及奖金制度的运作情
况。其次，我想要分析在这个过程中奖金制
度如何塑造校园文化——特别是如何影响教
师之间的信任关系与合作关系。我只是一名
研究者，并非想要通过此研究来判断或者评
价您的学校以及您的工作，过程中我也不会
收集任何教师或者学生的私人信息。我只是
希望能够了解您的经历、您对奖金的看法以
及奖金如何影响您的工作。 
Your Name, Your Mobile Phone Number, 
Your Email ID 
您的名字 , 您的电话号码您的, 箱 , 微信 
1) Have you ever received merit pay? If yes,
when? How much merit pay?
(1)您曾经获得过奖金吗？若有，是什么
时候获得？金额是多少？ 
2) In 2014 or 2015, did any teachers in your
school received merit pay? If yes,
approximately how many teachers? If yes,
approximately how much merit pay did each
teacher receive?
(2)在 2014年和 2015年期间，贵校有教
师获得奖金吗？若有，大概有几个人获得？
每人大约多少金额？ 
3) Do you consider your school a high ranking
or top performing school in Shanghai? If yes,
how do you know?
(3)在您看来，贵校在上海算是排名靠前
或者说是优质学校吗？如果是，您是怎么知
道的？ 
4) Would you be willing to participate in an
interview with the Research Assistants and I
about your experiences with merit pay? If yes,
please suggest the most convenient date and
time for you.
(4)您是否有兴趣参加访谈，向我和我的
研究助手分享您关于奖金制度的体验和经
历。如果您愿意，可以告诉我们您最方便的
时间。 
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Table 3 
Participant Inventory 
Participant title grade 
level(s) 
subject lessons leader gender years 
experience 
years 
at M1 
hometown 
1 administrator n/a 0 female 25 4 Shanghai 
2 teacher 3 Chinese 13 bzr female 23 8 Shanghai 
3 teacher 3 English 14 rd female 3 3 Shanghai 
4 teacher 1, 2 science grs female 2 2.5 Shanghai 
5 teacher 3 physical 
education 
11 grs female 12 4 Shanghai 
6 teacher 4 Chinese 12 bzr female 32 10 Shanghai 
7 teacher 5 English 10 ss female 12 8 Shanghai 
8 teacher 3 information 
technology 
11 male 4 4 Shanghai 
9 teacher 2 science 14 ad female 10 10 Shanghai 
10 teacher 3 math 13 grs female 12 8 Jiangsu 
11 teacher 2 Chinese 13 bzr; 
grs 
female 6 4 Heilongjiang 
12 teacher 1, 2 Music 16 ss female 16 3 Jiang xi 
13 teacher administrator 1, 2 Art 17 ss female 22 10 Shanghai 
14 teacher 3 English 13 grl female 2 2 Shanghai 
15 teacher 4 math 15 bzr female 1 1 Shanghai 
16 teacher 1 Chinese 16 ss female 15 15 Shanghai 
17 teacher 5 art 12 female 8 6 Shanghai 
18 teacher 4 music 11 female 7 5 Shanghai 
19 teacher 5 Chinese 13 female 6 6 Shanghai 
20 teacher 1 math 14 bzr female 3 3 Shanghai 
21 teacher 2 art 12 female 4 4 Shanghai 
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Table 4 
Experimental Evidence on Performance-Based Compensation 
PBC 
Program 
Incentive 
Level 
Citation Method Program 
Timeline 
Findings 
New York 
City, New 
York, USA 
Schoolwide Goodman and 
Turner, 2011 
RCT 2007-
2010 
There was no effect on student achievement among students in 
the treatment group. Teacher absenteeism dropped slightly 
among those in the treatment group who received the largest 
incentives. 
New York 
City, New 
York, USA 
Schoolwide Fryer, 2011 RCT 2007-
2010 
There was a negative but insignificant effect on student 
achievement, attendance, and graduation among students in the 
treatment group. There was a negative but insignificant effect 
on achievement among students in the treatment group in in 
larger schools. There was a negative but insignificant effect on 
teacher behaviors among teachers in the treatment group.  
New York 
City, New 
York, USA 
Schoolwide Marsh et al., 
2011 
RCT 2007-
2010 
There was a negative but insignificant effect on student 
achievement, attendance, and graduation among students in the 
treatment group. There was a negative but insignificant effect 
on achievement among students in the treatment group in in 
larger schools. There was a negative but insignificant effect on 
teacher behaviors among teachers in the treatment group. 
Nashville, 
Tennessee, 
USA 
Individual 
math 
teachers 
Springer et al., 
2010 
RCT 2006-
2009 
Student in the treatment group did not significantly outperform 
students in the control group. Teachers in the treatment group 
were no more likely to report that incentives discouraged 
teachers from working together. 
Andhra 
Pradesh, 
India 
Individual 
and 
Schoolwide 
Duflo, Hanna, 
and Ryan 2012 
RCT 2005-
2010 
There was a positive effect on teacher attendance and student 
achievement among teachers and students in the treatment 
group. 
Andhra 
Pradesh, 
India 
Individual 
and 
Schoolwide 
Muralidaran 
and 
Sundararaman, 
2011 
RCT 2005-
2010 
Students in the treatment group had higher scores in non-
incentive subjects – science and social studies. Students in the 
treatment group whose teachers received schoolwide incentives 
did not significantly improve in math but improved in language. 
Kenya Schoolwide Glewwe et al., 
2003 
RCT 1998-
1999 
Students in the treatment group improved performance, but this 
was not sustained the year after the program ended. Attendance 
improved among teachers in the treatment group slightly. 
33
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Table 4 
Experimental Evidence on Performance-Based Compensation 
PBC 
Program 
Incentive 
Level 
Citation Method Program 
Timeline 
Findings 
Israel Schoolwide Lavy, 2002 Regression 
discontinuity 
1996-
1997 
Students in the treatment group showed reduced rates in dropout 
and increases in the number of credits taken.  
Israel Individual Lavy, 2009 Regression 
discontinuity 
2000-
2001 
There was a slight positive effect on student achievement in math 
and English among students in the treatment group. Teachers in 
treatment groups were more likely to work extra time with low 
performing students, use small group instruction, and 
differentiated instruction.  
Little Rock, 
Arkansas, 
USA 
Individual Winters et al., 
2007 
Difference-
in-difference 
2003-
2006 
Students slightly improved their math performance. 
England, 
U.K. 
Individual Atkinson et al., 
2009 
Difference-
in-difference 
1999-
2002 
Students whose teachers had more experience showed higher test 
scores. 
Michigan, 
USA 
Individual Eberts et al., 
2002 
Difference-
in-difference 
1996-
1999 
Student improvement in course completion was the direct result 
of PBC. Student decline in attendance was not the direct result of 
PBC. 
North 
Carolina, 
USA 
Schoolwide Vigdor, 2008 Regression 
discontinuity 
1996-
2007 
Students whose teachers did not receive a bonus improved 
slightly.  
Dallas, 
Texas, USA 
Schoolwide Ladd, 1999 Difference-
in-difference 
1991-
1995 
Students improved in dropout, attendance, and slightly in math 
and reading. Principal turnover rates increased. 
USA Individual Figlio and 
Kenny, 2007 
OLS 
regression 
1988 
NELS 
and 1993 
SAS 
There was no effect on student achievement among students in 
schools with group- or school-based bonuses. There was a slightly 
significant slightly positive effect on student achievement among 
students in schools with individual bonuses. The largest positive 
effects on student achievement were in schools with individual 
bonuses and with the most students from low-income families.  
28 OECD 
nations 
Schoolwide 
and 
individual 
Woessman 
(2011) 
OLS 
regression 
2003 Students whose teachers received merit pay performed slightly 
better. 
Note. Adapted from “The Economics and Politics of Teacher Merit Pay,” by A. Leigh, 2012, CESIfo Economic Studies, 59, p. 1-33. 
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